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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a process model of the acquisition and
operation of early predictive behavior in young children, i.e.,
children's ability to accurately anticipate recurring sequences of
events. The principal question that the model addresses is: how do
children acquire predictive behavior from experience? The model
presented here, called GEL (Components of Episodic Learning) provides
an effective procedure for performing this acquisition process, and
has been used as the basis for a prototype computer system running at
the UCI Artificial Intelligence Project. The CEL model conforms to
the constraints provided by relevant results in psychology and
neurobiology; some observed stages of early child learning are
explained in terms of the model, and theoretical lesions to specific
parts of the model are used to predict particular behavioral deficits
that correspond well to documented deficits associated with lesions to
the hippocampus of human patients.
This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation
under grant IST-81-20685 and by the Naval Ocean Systems Center under
contract N00123-81-C-1078.
1.0 INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
Consider the following three observations by Piaget (1952) of his
daughter Jacqueline, first at birth, then at age 4 months 27 days, and'
finally at age 9 months 16 days;
[Observation 1]:
From birth sucking-like movements may be observed:
impulsive movement and protrusion of the lips accompanied by
protrusion of the tongue.... As soon as the hands rub the
lips, the sucking reflex is released (Piaget 1952, p.25).
[Observation 2]:
Jacqueline, at 0;4(27) and the days following, opens her
mouth as soon as she is shown the bottle. She only began
[bottle] feeding at 0;4(12) [i.e., fifteen days earlier]
(p.60) .
[Observation 3]:
At 0;9(16) ... she likes the grape juice in a glass, but
not the soup in a bowl. She watches her mother's activity.
When the spoon comes out of the glass she opens her mouth
wide, whereas when it comes from the bowl, her mouth remains
closed. (p.249)
These and scores of similar observations (e.g., Kessen 1967,
Papousek 1967, Sameroff 1971, Seligman 1970, etc.) support the notion
that a child progresses through distinguishable stages of ability,
beginning with innate or hereditary reactive abilities and eventually
acquiring predictive and discriminatory abilities.
In Observation 1, Jacqueline opens her mouth in reaction to its
being touched; that is, she opens it when she senses a touch on it,
but does not respond to any other cues, e.g., visual, aural, etc.,
that she is about to be fed. By the time of Observation 2, she is
able to predict when her mouth is about to be touched, and she opens
her mouth reliably in those circumstances which, she has learned, lead
to her being fed. In Observation 3, Jacqueline is able to
discriminate among different feeding episodes, depending on visual
(and other) cues. Based on her discriminatory prediction, she
implements what appears to be a plan of action, according to her
goals: she opens her mouth for the (predicted) arrival of a desirable
state (the taste of food she likes) and she shuts it to prevent a
predicted undesirable state (taste of food she doesn't like).
This paper presents a theory of how a child is able to progress
from initial reactive abilities, through predictive abilities, to
discriminatory abilities. In particular, what is presented is a
detailed analysis of the process components underlying this
progression, from the initial limited abilities Jacqueline exhibits in
early feeding episodes to the relatively powerful predictive and
discriminatory abilities she eventually acquires. This analysis has
resulted in a new memory model called CEL (Components of Episodic
Learning), which consists of a set of mechanisms, or operators. that
operate on memory structures we term episodic schemas. Taken
together, the operators and episodic memory structures of the CEL
model provide an effective procedure for both the acquisition and the
operation of early predictive and discriminatory behavior.
Parts of the CEL model have been implemented in a prototype
computer learning system called CEL-0. CEL-0 receives typed-in
afferent sensory input (e.g. having its mouth touched, sensing a
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particular taste) and produces both typed-out mental operations (e.g.,
storing or retrieving a particular episode) and efferent motor actions
(e.g., opening its mouth, moving its eyes). As the program operates,
it progresses through identifiable stages, initially exhibiting only
reactive behavior, then exhibiting predictive behavior, and finally
exhibiting simple discriminatory behavior.
Much work has been done in the fields of psychology and
psychobiology to account for aspects of observed early learning in
children. These two fields have traditionally been separated by their
respective methodologies, i.e., experimental work in psychology tends
to focus on observable behaviors, manipulating infant sensory and
motor behaviors and attempting to find capacities, limitations,
individual differences and developmental stages in infants' learning
abilities (e.g., Kagan 1970, Kessen 1967, Papousek 1967, Piaget 1952,
Sameroff 1968, etc.) while research in psychobiology has concentrated
mostly on the search for identifiable neural pathways corresponding to
observed behavior (e.g., Cohen 1980, Penfield 1959, Posner 1975,
Thompson 1980, Woody 1974, etc). The research presented here offers a
first step towards a characterization of the constituent functional
operators that comprise the learning process, in the hope that these
primitive operators may each have specific instantiations that can be
identified in the neural substrate. Toward that goal, a specific
suggestion is presented at the end of this paper, tentatively
identifying specific mental operators of the GEL model with the
function of a particular brain structure, the hippocampus, based on
results in psychobiology on both the normal functioning of the
hippocampus and the deficits associated with lesions to the
hippocampus.
The rest of this paper is organized into the following sections:
1. an analysis of three specific stages of learning that Jacqueline
proceeds through with repeated experiences, corresponding to her
behavioral ability to predict and discriminate among recurring
episodes;
2. A description of the twelve memory operators of the CEL model, and
their operation;
3. a detailed description of the operation of the CEL model in its
progression from initial stages of innate hereditary abilities
through the acquisition and operation of learned predictive and
anticipatory behaviors;
4. a larger view of the extended chronology of development of the CEL
model;
5. some conclusions, including specific suggestions about the
possible localization in the brain of certain operators of the CEL
model.
2.0 INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL
2.1 Three stages of early episodic learning
Jacqueline can be said to pass through a series of three
identifiable stages in going from her initial innate hereditary
abilities to the eventual behavior described in Observations 2 and 3
above. (Note that although Piaget's observations of child behavior
are used as examples in this paper, our theoretical model does not
directly embrace his, and in fact some aspects of our analysis of
behavior into stages conflicts with Piaget's.)
Following is a description of our analysis of the salient
features of each of these three behavioral observations:
1. Sub-stage 1: Hereditarv Behavior
Initially the child opens its mouth in response to any touch on
the mouth, and does not respond to other contextual cues of
impending feeding, such as visual or aural cues.
2. Sub-stage 2: Acquired Predictive Behavior
The child learns to open its mouth on the basis of other sensory
input, e.g., sight, sound, smell, etc., before the mouth is
touched, in circumstances which in the past have led to the
child's getting fed.
3. Sub-stage 3: Acquired Discriminatorv Behavior
The child differentially opens or closes its mouth in response to
particular contextual cues, depending on whether those cues have,
in previous instances, preceded the child's receiving desirable
versus undesirable tastes.
(As stated above, these three stages are actually only sub-stages in a
larger view of the overall chronology of learned episodic memories.
An overview of this extended chronology is offered in a later section
of this paper, following the description of CEL's operation within
these three sub-stages of learning.)
2.2 The five categories of operators in the CEL model
The CEL model is an attempt to provide a well-specified and
plausible process that can account for both the child's behavior at
each stage and the child's transitions between stages. The model thus
presents a unified theoretical framework within which to view the
child's continuous progress towards complex learned behavior.
The first step in this framework is the subdivision of the
overall functions of learning and memory into five basic categories,
as follows;
1„ Reception;
The establishment of a temporary memory trace from incoming
sensory data; i.e., creating a short-term memory trace.
2. Recording;
Consolidation of a temporary memory trace into a permanent memory
trace, in such a way as to allow for the subsequent effective
retrieval of that memory in appropriate situations.
3. Retrieval;
Activation of existing memories when and if they are appropriate
to the processing of incoming experiential data.
4. Reconstruction;
The use of existing memories to process incoming data, e.g., to
predict and react to new experiences on the basis of previously
recorded and retrieved memories.
5. Refinement;
The alteration of memory traces on the basis of successes,
failures and differences between recorded memories and new
incoming episodes; e.g., strengthen and weaken associations,
reinforce, extinguish, differentiate, etc.
Consider for instance Jacqueline's transition from stage 1 to
stage 2, that is, the process of her learning to open her mouth in
response to the sight of the bottle. In order for Jacqueline to
acquire this predictive behavior, she must initially receive sensory
input of events in the external world, and record in her memory some
representation of the sequence of events in this feeding episode; we
term the result of this recording an episodic schema. This initial
recording becomes the 'kernel' schema for her subsequent learned
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predictive behavior in subsequent instances of the episode. Once
recorded, she must be able later to retrieve this episodic schema,
when similar subsequent sequences of events occur, and to make use of
the retrieved schema to reconstruct both the afferent events that
comprise the episode and the efferent actions that she must enact as
part of the episode, all the while refining the schema to correspond
ever more closely to the regularities and variations in recurring
instances of the event sequence comprising the episode.
3.0 THE TWELVE OPERATORS OF THE CEL MODEL
Within the framework of this functional subdivision of memory
processing, the CEL model identifies a set of twelve 'primitive'
memory operators which, taken together, perform these five classes of
memory manipulation. The CEL model, then, consists of the operation
of these twelve operators on episodic schemata. The model describes
the child's behavior at each stage and transitions between stages, all
in terms of the performance of these operators to receive, record,
retrieve, reconstruct and refine episodic schemata. The following
sections provide introductory descriptions of the processing of each
of the twelve CEL operators.
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3.1 Reception and Recording
3.1.1 The Reception operators
The CEL model contains two Reception operators, termed DETECT and
SELECT, which modulate the reception of experiential input; the
DETECT operator reads streams of sensory inputs, while the SELECT
operator moves inputs to 'short-term' memory, thereby establishing a
temporary memory trace.
The DETECT operator can be thought of as a sensory input
mechanism, monitoring inputs from the senses, modulated by the
relative state of arousal of the organism. A great deal of work in
psychobiology has been done on attention mechanisms (see e.g., Posner
1975, Weinberger 1980); the CEL model doesn't focus on problems of
attention or arousal, and hence makes the simplifying assumption that
the organism is attending to all sensory input, and therefore will
reliably DETECT all incoming sensory stimuli. The SELECT mechanism
chooses which of the incoming DETECTed inputs should be written into
temporary or short-term memory, to establish an ordered list of
representations of experiential events. These two operators are
discussed further in a later section of this paper.
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3.1.2 The Recording operators
Once representations of external experiential events have been
established in a temporary memory trace, the Recording operators may -
act to move parts of that trace into permanent memory.
gel's first Recording operator, NOTICE, monitors the
characteristics of events written into the temporary trace by the
SELECT operator, checking those characteristics against an internal
set of known desirable and undesirable features; a match will cause
NOTICE to trigger the rest of the Recording mechanisms, initiating the
movement of the temporary trace into long-term or permanent memory.
Children are born with certain inherent likes and dislikes, e.g.,
certain tastes, sounds, touches that they react to immediately (see
e.g.. Bower 1974, Kessen 1967, Piaget 1952, Sameroff 1971). It is
this set of built-in or 'hereditary' likes and dislikes that initially
invoke the NOTICE mechanism in the CEL model.
The actual movement of a temporary trace into long-term memory is
performed by the second Recording operator, COLLECT, which simply
'copies' the contents of temporary memory into permanent memory,
whenever it is triggered by the NOTICE operator. The result is the
first step in the creation of an episodic schema. This schema
initially consists of simply the ordered list of events up to and
including the event that invoked the NOTICE mechanism.
Once a memory trace is in permanent memory, it must be able to be
retrieved later on, at just the appropriate times for it to be used to
predictively process subsequent similar event sequences. The
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COLLECTion of a memory trace into permanent memory is not by itself
sufficient to enable that memory to be subsequently recalled at
appropriate times, any more than flinging a set of documents into a
' *
large file drawer means that the documents have been saved. In either
case, the records are not retrievable except by either exhaustive
search or by 'stumbling upon' them by accident. To be retrievable,
then, i.e., to be available to Jacqueline's memory at subsequent
appropriate times, the episode must be indexed, according to the
situational circumstances that that memory might prove useful for
predictive processing later on. CEL's third and final Recording
operator, INDEX, adds to the COLLECTED memory trace a pointer that
will later be matched with •experiential input indicating that this
memory might be relevant to the processing of the new input.
i
3.1.3 Summary; Reception and Recording Operators
The CEL model hypothesizes five operators to perform the
functions of Reception and Recording: the two Reception operators,
DETECT and SELECT, modulate the establishment of a temporary memory
trace from experiential input, and the three Recording operators,
I
NOTICE, COLLECT and INDEX function to create a usable permanent memory
trace (an episodic schema) from the temporary trace.
Figure 1 illustrates the operation and interaction of these five
operators.
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<FIGURE 1 GOES ABOUT HERE>
3.2 Retrieval and Reconstruction
When Jacqueline subsequently experiences some event that
initiated the previously-recorded episode, she retrieves that memory
and uses it reconstructively to behave predictively in the new
episode.
3.2.1 The Retrieval operators
When an episodic schema has been indexed according to some
particular early event in the sequence (e.g., seeing a bottle before
being fed) , then the next time that event occurs, the entire schema is
recalled. This 'reminding' phenomenon (see Schank 1981) is a result
of the schema's index being matched against the new occurrence of the
event. This matching process is constantly going on: i.e., every new
experience written into temporary memory is checked to see whether it
could be an index into an existing episodic schema in long-term
memory. The CEL operator that performs this continual matching
function is called REMIND.'
(Note that if the Reception operators either fail to DETECT a
i
particular sensory input, due to low arousal state, etc., or fail to
SELECT that sensory input tjo be written into temporary memory, due to
'selective attention' (seeje.g., Posner 1975, Weinberger 1980), then
the experience will not cause REMINDing, and the relevant episodic
I
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schema may not be retrieved. As was mentioned earlier, the CEL model
currently does not account
attention.)
for such issues of arousal or selective
Once an input has REMINDed the CEL model of a particular episodic
schema, then another operator, ACTIVATE, attaches that schema to the
upcoming Reconstruction processes, so that the schema can be used to
process the current incoming experiences.
3.2.2 The Reconstruction operators
Once an episodic schema has been found and retrieved via the
REMIND and ACTIVATE operators, the organism (e.g., Jacqueline) will
'reconstruct' the memory as though the current episode were a new
instance of the remembered one. This reconstruction process has two
components; (1) monitoring the similarities and variations between
the afferent events occurring in the current episode and those in the
retrieved schema; this function is performed by the SYNTHESIZE
operator; and (2) actually producing efferent 'motor' actions
corresponding to those which were recorded as having occurred in the
original episode; that is, the organism re-creates the mental and
physical states associated with each of the events in the schema, via
the ENACT operator. In the case of efferent events (those performed
by the child, e.g., opening mouth, moving arms, moving eyes), ENACTing
the event results in the performance of the motor action itself. In
the case of afferent events in the schema, however, (things that
happen to the child, e.g., sensing a visual input, sensing a taste
input, etc.), the child can only re-create the mental and physical
16
state associated with having sensed the particular afferent event, and
cannot of course by itself cause the afferent event to recur.
Figure 2 illustrates the coordinated operation of the four
Retrieval and Reconstruction operators.
<FIGURE 2 GOES ABOUT HERE>
3.3 Refinement
The process of reconstruction results in a SYNTHESIZEd record of
the similarities and differences between the previously-recorded
episode and the one just experienced. This record is used to refine
the memorial schema corresponding to these episodes, so that it will
accurately reflect the overall regularities and variations in such
episodes. The GEL model contains three Refinement operators;
REINFORCE, BRANCH and DETOUR.
The REINFORCE operator acts to increment the strength of
connections between individual events in an episodic schema; each
recurrence of a particular event in an episode results in an increment
to the strength of this link.
Reciprocally, the BRANCH operator causes a new branch to be
created in the episodic schema being reconstructed, based on any match
failure by the SYNTHESIS operator.
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Both REINFORCE and BRANCH are triggered only by the SYNTHESIZE
operator, depending on whether that operator finds a match or a
mismatch, respectively, between the incoming experienced event and the
(predicted) event in the schema being Reconstructed. The final
Refinement operator, DETOUR, is triggered by the INDEX operator, in
cases where the schema to be indexed was triggered (NOTICEd) by an
undesirable state (e.g., a bad taste). The DETOUR operator functions
to prevent the recurrence of any episode that leads to an undesirable
result state; e.g., when Jacqueline is fed something with a bad
taste, she NOTICES and COLLECTS the sequence of events leading to this
undesirable outcome, but she presumably does not wish to repeat it in
the future, but rather to avoid it. Hence, in an episode with an
undesirable outcome, the INDEX operator triggers the DETOUR operator
to create a route around the events leading to this outcome, thereby
acting to prevent its recurrence.
Further discussion of the three Refinement operators is provided
in later sections of this paper; Figure 3 illustrates each of these
operators' functions.
<FIGURE 3 GOES ABOUT HERE>
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3.4 Partial summary: the twelve CEL operators
Twelve operators have been introduced to perform the five
learning and memory functions described above:
Reception operators Reconstruction operators
DETECT SYNTHESIZE
SELECT ENACT
Recording operators Refinement operators
NOTICE REINFORCE
COLLECT BRANCH
INDEX DETOUR
Retrieval operators
REMIND
ACTIVATE
These operators act in parallel and semi-independently in the CEL
model; e.g., during reconstruction of a retrieved episodic schema, an
incoming experience may cause the REMINDing of yet another schema.
Figure 4 roughly illustrates the overall flow of control of the twelve
operators. Some of the more complex interactions that arise among
operators are discussed in a later section of this paper.
<FIGURE 4 GOES ABOUT HERE>
The following sections contain brief discussions of some work in
psychology, and in the neurobiology of learning and memory,
illustrating some of the observations that have played a part in the
development of the CEL model.
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3,5 Brief discussion of some related work
3.5.1 Piaget
Piaget (1952) offers a number of incisive observations of infant,
and child behavior, in support of his view of learning as the
operation of the reciprocal functions of 'assimilation' and
'accommodation' on memory structures he terms 'schemata'. While
providing a tantalizing glimpse of a unified learning and memory
process underlying a wide range of observations, Piaget fails to
specify any sort of effective procedure that might perform aspects of
the assimilation or accommodation functions. Piaget does offer a
useful categorization of types of schema acquisition, including a
chronology of the stages of learning a child passes through. The CEL
model is compatible with Piaget's observations, and is even compatible
with much of his theoretical views regarding the growth of memory
schemata. However, since his theories are primarily descriptive in
nature and do not analyze the process components of assimilation or
accommodation, nor explain how they are carried out, the CEL model has
had to 'fill in' a great deal that may have been implied by Piaget but
is not explicit in his work. Even so, the CEL model accounts for only
a small fraction of the huge chronology of learned behavior that
Piaget presents.
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3.5.2 Pavlovian conditioning
One of the traditional learning paradigms of psychobiology is
that of classical conditioning, i.e., the presentation of sequences of'
events to an organism, such that the organism eventually learns to
react to the initial event by behaving in a manner that was previously
only associated with the final event in the sequence. In terms of the
GEL model, classical conditioning is viewed as just an instance of the
episodic learning evidenced by predictive reactions. Experiments in
conditioning have led to the creation of (at least) two schools of
investigation of learning: the 'behaviorist' and 'cognitive'
approaches. The behaviorist view is an extreme one, asserting that
learning is no more or less than the 'pairing' of stimuli to
behavioral responses; that is, what is learned is the observable
behavioral response itself, not any internal memory representation
(e.g., Hull 1943, 1951, 1952).
More 'cognitive' views of learning admit of memory structures and
brain mechanisms that manipulate them (see e.g., Tolman 1949), and are
more compatible with the approach presented here. The GEL model views
conditioning as the acquisition of an episodic schema that begins with
the conditioned stimulus (GS) and passes through the unconditioned
stimulus (UGS) to the (conditioned) response (GR). Furthermore, the
existence in an organism of any initial pairing of unconditioned
stimulus and response, i.e., reactive behavior exhibited upon
presentation of a stimulus without prior conditioning, is evidence of
the presumed existence of an episodic schema (either innate or
previously learned) that begins with the UGS and leads to the
21
response. An example is that of the (hereditary) schema in a child
that begins with the sensory input of a touch to the mouth and leads
to the efferent action of opening the mouth and sucking (see e.g.,
Sameroff 1971).
Among the traditional aspects of conditioning not accounted for
by the CEL model, are the phenomena associated with the time and
number of trials it takes to learn particular tasks. Though the CEL
model does contain mechanisms for the reinforcement, habituation and
extinguishing of learned behavior (via the Refinement operators) the
model does not accurately predict the variations in learning time that
have been observed experimentally and modeled mathematically (see
e.g., Norman and Rumelhart 1970, Wickelgren and Norman 1966).
3.5.3 Some AI models of memory and brain function
Arbib and Caplan (1979), in a discussion of AI models of the
neurology of linguistics, argue for a 'coordinated control program' to
account for the neurological underpinnings of language processing. A
major problem here is that the low-level functioning of the brain is
so far removed from the higher cognitive processes of language use
that it is crucial, in attempting to form any bridge between them, to
acknowledge the intervening stages of processing between language and
brain function. In a response to Arbib and Caplan's (1979) paper,
Locke (1979) asks: "how 'nonlinguistic' neurological functions - the
cellular, the distributed, the systematized, and the behavioral - are
translated in hierarchical form to culminate in language" (p.471).
The CEL model does not attempt an explanation of the acquisition ot
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use of language; rather, it is an attempt to analyze the functions
underlying much more simple and low-level behavior first, before
attempting to build a bridge up from these low-level functions to
higher cognitive processes.
Another problem with Arbib and Caplan's (1979) theory is their
adoption of the HEARSAY system as a proposed model for neurological
functioning. HEARSAY was not designed with neurological modeling in
mind, but rather was an engineering task (of mammoth proportions)
which was intended to provide a control structure within which other
AI systems could be constructed. Hence, it is important for Arbib and
Caplan to explain how it is that HEARSAY could have accidentally
become a good model of neurological function. They attempt such an
explanation, but, as Marshall (1979) responds: "it is totally unclear
what specific hypotheses are supposed to be embedded within the
blooming, buzzing confusion of the implementation. ... It follows
from the failure to distinguish theory and implementation that HEARSAY
is unlikely to suggest a new account of, for example, jargon aphasia
or transcortical motor aphasia" (p.472).
Small, Cottrell and Shastri (1982) have also worked on the
question of language understanding in the context of what they call
'connectionist models' (based on Feldman and Ballard 1982) which
consist of interactive nets of 'computing units' which have states,
inputs and outputs, and which are on the whole suggestively designed
to resemble aspects of neural nets. In particular. Small
et.al. intend to "emphasize a processing structure [for natural
language understanding] which is closer to the neuronal hardware"
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(p.247). Much the same objection must be made here as to Arbib and
Caplan, above; namely, that the neuron level is entirely the wrong'
level for an analysis of language use; rather, much more low-level
cognitive abilities such as simple prediction and discrimination must'
be accounted for first, since the (human) brain acquires these
cognitive abilities first, and may use them as 'building block'
abilities along the way to laying a foundation for eventual learned
language abilities. A model that attempts to explain language use
directly in terms of neuronal assemblies is, in our view, skipping a
huge number of intermediate stages in the probable processing chain
from language down to brain structures.
Becker (1973) presented a theoretical system for the encoding of
experiential information, which has served as part of the initial
inspiration the CEL model. Becker denies that his model has any
relation with "the physiological representation of experience in the
brain" (p.396), but implies that the system is intended to be a
cognitive model, both by the name of the model (JCM) and the
terminology of 'schemata' throughout. Nonetheless, Becker's system
focuses on details of the operation of his model system in an
artificial environment, without directly relating the design decisions
that went into the model to any psychological observations or
neurobiological data.
Schank (1981) has presented a model of memory organization based
on MOPs (Memory Organization Packets) , which attempt to account for
the phenomena of 'reminding' that occur as a person understands a
situation:
At the root of our ability to understand is our ability
to find the most relevant memory at just the right time.
This can mean being able to tell a good story that
illustrates a point, as well as being able to recall a prior
experience that will shed light on how we should act during
the experience we are currently processing. To bring to
mind exactly the right experience at exactly the right time
requires a memory organization that is capable of indexing
episodes in such a way as to have them available for use
when they are needed. This implies an indexing scheme that
has at its base processing considerations. That is, if a
particular memory is relevant to processing at a certain
point, it should ideally be indexed in terms of its
processing relevance. Processing relevance means the
ability to come to mind at just the point where that memory
would be most useful for processing (Schank 1981, p.41).
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We view our model as compatible with and complementary to
Schank's theory of memory organization; in terms of the CEL model,
MOPs theory concentrates on the formation and retrieval of complex
indices that an adult human would (eventually) develop in order to
organize his knowledge of real world situations. In comparison, CEL
so far deals with relatively simple indexes, because it is a model of
an extremely early stage of development — i.e., our domain is that of
a child with very little experience of real world events as yet. The
episodic schemata of the CEL model, then, are intended to be
compatible developmental precursors of MOPs, but the focus of our
research is on the memory operators that manipulate memory structures,
rather than on the structures themselves; i.e., the operators that
enable the reception, recording, retrieval, reconstruction and
refinement of such memory structures, in such a way as to account for
both the acquisition and operation of very early predictive reactions
in children.
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3.5.4 Some psychobiological results
Many researchers in psychobiology have pursued the goal of
identifying the neural pathways underlying specific low-level
behaviors, in the context of a constrained 'model' system. For
instance, Cohen (1966, 1969, 1974, 1978) has pursued a decades-long
program of research aimed at identifying the neural pathways
underlying a specific small set of behaviors; that of the conditioned
heart-rate change of the pigeon in response to a simple visual cue.
If this line of research proves successful, there will still
remain the task of identifying which particular parts of the overall
neural pathway are performing which of the component functions of the
overall learned (conditioned) behavior. In order to do this, there
must first exist some theoretical characterization of the underlying
constituent operations that comprise the processes of learning and
memory, such that these theoretical constituents might then be
correlated with particular brain structures. Or, in Tolman's (1936)
words: "A psychology cannot be explained by a physiology until one
has a psychology to explain" (p.90).
While some researchers (e.g., John 1972, 1980) have suggested the
extreme hypothesis that the entire brain may be involved in nearly
every mental event, most research in psychobiology assumes some
component of localization of function. As a representative instance.
Diamond et. al. (see e.g.. Diamond 1976, Bennett, Diamond, Krech and
Rosenzweig 1964), have attempted to map regional anatomical changes in
rat brains (e.g., increases and decreases in number and length of
synapses on dendritic spines in the cerebral cortex) , in response to
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differences in the environments of caged rats. Having established a
number of such regional synaptic changes in the brain. Diamond then
asks, in conclusion, "What do all of these anatomical changes mean
with regard to brain function?" (Diamond 1976, p.237). Again, this
question is calling for a theoretical characterization of the
constituent functions that comprise the brain's overall operation, so
that these theoretical constituents might be correlated with
particular brain structures. It is hoped that the CEL model may
provide a first step towards such a characterization.
4.0 OPERATION OF THE CEL MODEL; AN EXTENDED EXAMPLE
This section examines in some depth the theoretical operation of
the CEL model in the process of learning first simple predictive
behavior and then simple discriminatory behavior. The example
presented here is that of Jacqueline, progressing from stage 1 to 3;
at each stage, and each transition between stages, the model's
operation is described and illustrated with a diagram.
4.1 Behavior of the model at stage 1
The initial operation of the model (i.e., at stage 1) is driven
by innate schemata, and by experiential input. The innate schema
associated with the example of Jacqueline's feeding behavior consists
of three events, the first of which is afferent and the next two
efferent:
1. child's mouth is touched
2. child opens mouth
3. child sucks, swallows
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Hence, when the model receives sensory input of its mouth being
touched via the DETECT and SELECT operators, the experience will
REMIND the model of this innate schema, and the schema will be
ACTIVATEd. The model will then reconstructively ENACT the efferent
actions in the schema, i.e., perform the motor actions of opening its
mouth, and sucking and swallowing. The 'operator transition diagram'
in Figure 5 illustrates the coordination of these operators to produce
the observed behavior at stage 1.
<FIGURE 5 GOES ABOUT HERE>
4.2 Progression of the model from stage 1 to stage 2
When the model experiences a taste that it innately finds
desirable (e.g., milk) then the model will NOTICE this desirable
event, will COLLECT the contents of short-term memory into a new
episodic schema, and will INDEX that schema by (at least) the context
of events initiating the schema (e.g., visual cues such as the room
surroundings, the sight of mother, the sight of the food and
containers, etc). In the specific case being analyzed here, the
events COLLECTed into the schema will be as follows;
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1. Child sees surroundings (e.g., bottle, mother, room, chair, etc.)
2. Child's mouth is touched (thereby triggering hereditary sucking
schema via REMINDing and ACTIVATION)
3. Child opens mouth (i.e., ENACTing the ACTIVATEd schema)
4. Child sucks, swallows (still ENACTing)
5. Child tastes (desirable) milk.
It is this final tasting experience that causes the NOTICE mechanism
to trigger the COLLECT and INDEX mechanisms. (The strength of this
schema is incremented, i.e., reinforced, in subsequent REMINDed
experiences, via the Refinement operators). Figure 6 diagrams part of
the process of these operators establishing a kernel episodic schema
corresponding to the new feeding episode.
<FIGURE 6 GOES ABOUT HERE>
4.3 Behavior of the model at stage 2
The model has now established an episodic schema beginning with
the sight of the bottle and progressing to getting fed milk. When the
model is presented with new instances of the sight of the bottle, the
schema is REMINDed and ACTIVATEd, and the the Reconstruction operator
ENACT begins to re-create the mental and physical states associated
with each of the events in the ACTIVATEd schema.
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Since the first two events are afferent, the ENACT operator can
only re-create the mental state of sensing the afferent event, and
cannot cause the event to recur, as discussed above, in the section
introducing the Reconstruction operators. The first event (seeing the
bottle) has already occurred, causing the REMINDing in the first
place, but the second event, sensing a touch on the mouth, has not yet
occurred. Nonetheless, the child ENACTs the mental correlate of
sensing that touch, and goes on to the next event, without having to
wait for that touch to actually occur in the external world. The next
events are efferent (opening mouth and sucking), and hence those
events are carried out as motor actions. It is this aspect of the
ENACTing process that causes the apparent phenomenon of 'predictive'
behavior; i.e., the child now opens its mouth before being touched,
apparently in direct response to the sight of the bottle. Hence, the
apparent predictive behavior is actually a side-effect or artifact of
the process of Reconstructive ENACTing of a pre-recorded episodic
schema.
Figure 7 illustrates the operation of the model to exhibit this
predictive behavior.
<FIGURE 7 GOES ABOUT HERE>
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4.4 Progression of the model from stage 2 to stage 3
When the child is presented with a feeding episode that begins
similarly to previous feeding episodes, (e.g., contains the same or
similar visual, aural and other cues) then the child will likely be
REMINDed of the predictive schema developed above. If some particular
episode, however, results in an undesirable taste (e.g., of a new food
such as soup), then a number of mental events will be triggered.
First the undesirable taste will be NOTICEd, just as the desirable
taste was in the first step of the transition from stage 1 to stage 2,
described above. The NOTICEing will initiate COLLECTion and INDEXing,
and a new episodic schema will be established, beginning with, say,
some initiating visual cues and leading to an undesirable state.
Simultaneously, the undesirable taste will trigger (via REMINDing
and ACTIVATION) another innate episodic schema, corresponding to the
'gag reflex', i.e., is initiated by the afferent event of an
undesirable taste and leads to efferent actions of the child spitting
and closing its mouth. Hence, the child will ENACT those efferent
events in response to the bad taste.
Because this episode leads to an undesirable result state, the
INDEX operator triggers the Refinement operator DETOUR to block the
path to this event sequence, preventing it from being re-enacted; and
to provide an alternative path, if possible, around the undesirable
sequence. Alternative paths are provided any time some additional
episodic schema is triggered via REMINDing, during the Reconstruction
of the undesirable episode. Such an alternative path is provided in
this particular instance, by the REMINDed innate schema for gagging in
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response to an undesired taste. Hence, that schema is pointed to by
the DETOUR operator as the alternate schematic path to pursue in
subsequent instances of this episode. That is, the memory of the
entire sequence of events will be recorded just as it occurred, but it
will be indexed (via the DETOUR operator) in such a way as to cause
the child to ENACT the alternate episodic path (gag reflex), instead
of the one leading to the undesirable taste, whenever this schema is
next Retrieved.
This is the most complex process the GEL model has performed so
far, containing as it does both an unexpected branch of an episode and
an undesirable result to that branch. Figure 8 illustrates the
performance of the operators that carry out this process.
<FIGURE 8 GOES ABOUT HERE>
4.5 Behavior of the model at stage 3
Once the model has created the appropriate branches and detours
in the relevant episodic schemata (i.e., by stage 3), its behavior is
much simpler to explain than was the transition between stages 2 and
3. Whenever the visual input contains a match with the description of
the appropriate object (e.g., soup bowl, juice glass, bottle, etc.),
the model will pursue the schema (or schema branch) that is pointed to
by that initiator. In cases of desirable outcomes, the appropriate
schema is pursued; in cases of undesirable outcomes, the alternate
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'detour' branch of the schema is pursued. Figure 9 illustrates the
sample behavior of the model in response to the sight of the soup bowl
in the proper surroundings.
<FIGURE 9 GOES ABOUT HERE>
4.6 General discussion
There are a number of interesting aspects of the model's
operation that are worth noting. This section contains a brief
discussion of some of these aspects; Granger (1982) contains some
more extensive discussions.
1. Prediction is an artifact of reconstruction;
As pointed out at stage 2 above, apparent predictive behavior
of the child is actually explained in the GEL model in terms of
the Reconstructive ENACTing of a pre-recorded schema. It is only
because the child need not wait for the external world to match
his ENACTing of afferent events that he appears to be performing
the (observable) efferent events in anticipation of the outcome of
the schema.
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2. Pursuit vs. avoidance:
The CEL model does not provide a completely adequate account
of how a child learns to prevent undesired states, as opposed to -
pursuing desired states. In the example above, the model uses the
innate gag reflex to avoid a bad taste, but a more general
reaction such as pushing the food away with her hand might not be
so readily explained.
3. Individual differences:
The model is based on the assumption that the child depends
on experiential inputs in order to create new schemata. This
assumption will mean that different children will construct
schemata with different initial kernels, depending on what event
sequences they happen to be presented with (and which ones they
attend to). However, through the mechanisms of Reconstruction and
Refinement, the differences among initial schema kernels between
different children will be largely erased over enough repeated
experiences with a recurring episodic sequence. Hence, given
children that are presented with similar episodes, the eventual
constructed schemata will not be excessively sensitive to initial
individual differences, though such differences may of course
persist to some extent.
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4. Attention:
Before the model can learn to react to, e.g., visually
experienced events, it must learn to reliably attend to a visual
event long enough to represent and record it. For instance, the
child must learn to hold his gaze on a particular object in the
visual field (e.g., the bottle) before he can learn to use that
visual input to predict what will happen next.
In particular, the CEL model can acquire sensorimotor
'recognitory schemata' which consist of interleaved events of
motor eye movements alternating with sensory SELECTion of visual
input, accounting for the child's ability to perform a pattern of
'scanning' an object with his eyes, checking for the existence of
'salient' features of the object. What was represented above as a
single visual event (e.g., seeing a bottle) is actually a
shorthand for a sequence of visual scanning events that
selectively identify features of the object in the visual field,
thereby 'recognizing' the features as matching similar features
that were 'learned' in the form of a recognitory (scanning)
episodic schema. Hence, the first visual event (seeing the
bottle) initiating the predictive 'feeding' schema is itself
actually a whole sequence of visual inputs and eye movements. (On
the other hand, direct sensory stimulation (e.g., touching the
child's mouth) does NOT require any coordinated recognitory
schemata on the child's part, and hence can be used as initiators
to innate schemata without any prior learning being necessary.
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5, Reinforcement and extinction;
Reinforcement occurs in the model simply by the operation of
the REINFORCE operator, which adds a link between events in a
schema. Extinction of a learned response occurs by a branch being
formed in the schema, indicating a failure of the events to occur
the same way as before; and sufficient numbers of subsequent
REINFORCEments of that new branch will eventually overpower the
original path through the schema. That is, a number of different
branches may radiate from a given particular event in a schema,
and each such path may have been repeated, and therefore
reinforced, a number of times. Whenever the ENACT operator
reaches such a juncture, it takes one or another of the available
paths (not including paths that have been DETOURed around).
Hence, after enough reinforcement of an alternate path, that path
will be more likely to be pursued than other paths that have not
been reinforced as much.
6. Three types of generalization:
The operation of the model results in three different types
of modification of schemata, all of which can loosely be termed
'generalization'; we term them 'recognition-generalization',
'result-generalization' and 'sequence-generalization'.
Briefly, the first occurs when a visual initiator of a schema
contains a number of salient features, e.g., the surroundings when
Jacqueline is fed. In such cases, variations in the visual
surroundings will be tolerated, i.e., will still cause REMINDing
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of the appropriate episodic schema, because the child will not
have SELECTed all of the possible features in the scanned visual
field to be initiators of the schema. Hence, as long as the
SELECTed features are present, then other omissions or additions..
will be irrelevant. If, on the other hand, some different outcome
occurs during some instance of the episode, then the SYNTHESIZE
operator will trigger the BRANCH mechanism to create a
differential branch on the basis of the differing features.
'Result-generalization' denotes the fact that the child will
allow minor feature variations in the result state at the end of a
schema, again depending on what features of that result were
SELECTively attended to.
'Sequence-generalization' refers to the model's ability to
record versions of an episode that begin similarly but go through
differing sequences of events before arriving at the same result.
Again, this is accomplished not by a specific internal
'generalization' mechanism, but as a side-effect of the BRANCH
operator's establishment of separate branches of a single schema,
in response to variations in the event sequence noted by the
SYNTHESIZE operator's comparison function.
37
4.7 Extended chronology of CEL's learning
The three sub-stages of learned behavior that have served as the
focus for this paper actually comprise only a small example of the set
of learned behaviors that can be accounted for by the twelve operators
of the CEL model and its expandable store of episodic schemata.
Following is a brief outline of a larger view of the chronology of
learned reactions, from innate hereditary behavior to advanced
conceptual behavior.
1. Hereditary Schemata
orienting and defense reactions
sucking reaction
sucking-search reaction
others; eye-tracking, limb movement.
2. Early Acquired Sensorimotor Schemata
hand-eye coordination
predictive and discriminatory reactions
goal-directed episode initiation
3. Advanced Acquired Conceptual Schemata
object permanence
object categorization indices
action categorization indices (e.g., primitive ACTs)
situational categorization indices
(e.g., causality, intention)
communication indices
In this 'timeline* of learning, the CEL model accounts only for
behaviors up through the 'Early Acquired Sensorimotor Schemata'. The
acquisition of the 'Advanced Conceptual Schemata' that follow in human
learning requires an Extended CEL model, discussed in the Conclusion
section of this paper. The following sections very briefly discuss
some aspects of these additional examples of learned behaviors, A
more extensive discussion of the chronology of CEL's learning is
contained in Granger (1982).
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4.7.1 Hereditary schemata
The 'orienting' and 'defense' reactions (Sokolov 1963) are
innately present in all organisms, and consist roughly of increased
heart rate, respiration, blood flow, etc., etc., in reaction to the
presentation of virtually any new stimulus. These reactions
presumably underlie the Reception mechanisms DETECT and SELECT, and
the Recording mechanism NOTICE, since these are the operators that
must respond to new stimuli, before there exist any schemata to deal
with these stimuli.
The 'sucking-search' reaction has been described by many
researchers (see e.g.. Bower 1974, Bruner 1973, Piaget 1952). This is
the innate reaction that causes head-turns in the infant as soon as
parts of his face are touched. The innate versions of these
head-turns are uncoordinated, i.e., they are as likely to turn the
child away from the touch as towards it; but the schema is very
quickly extended to cause the head to turn in the direction of the
touch.
Eye-tracking reactions by infants have also been extensively
observed (e.g., Kessen 1967); again, these reactions begin as
uncoordinated motor movements of the eye, but soon are refined into
schemata that cause the eyes to move reliably to keep a particular
object in the visual field, thereby 'tracking' the object. Similarly,
the innate 'grasping' reaction requires learning trials before the
child can reliably move its limbs in the direction of a seen object.
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4.7.2 Early Acquired Sensorimotor Schemata
All of the above innate hereditary schemata become refined as a
natural effect of their use, and eventually give rise to more
coordinated schemata that appear in the form of apparently more
'purposive' behavior on the part of the child. The examples of
predictive and discriminatory behavior during feeding have already
been discussed, and it has been shown how those behaviors can be
developed via reconstruction and refinement from simple built-in
hereditary schemata. Other examples of acquired sensorimotor schemata
include the ability to maintain a field of view, arising out of the
hereditary eye-tracking and head-turning schemata; scanning objects
in the field of view (e.g., faces), also arising out of the above two
hereditary schemata (we have referred to the schemata underlying such
visual scanning behavior as 'recognitory schemata'); simple hand-eye
coordination arises out of the tracking schemas together with the
grasping schema. The acquisition and operation of all of these
schemata can all be explained within the theoretical framework of the
CEL model.
4.7.3 Advanced Acquired Conceptual Schemata
Human children are able to go beyond the above learned behaviors
to exhibit such advanced abilities as 'object permanence', categories,
causality, intention, and language. The CEL model does not account
for the acquisition of any of these abilities. It is interesting to
note that these abilities are much the same ones that most other
animals (besides man) also seem incapable of learning. One of the
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questions we hope to address in future research deals with the
question of just what extra underlying mental abilities or operations
in humans enable the acquisition of these advanced abilities? This
question is discussed further in the Conclusions section of this
paper.
4.8 Summary of extended chronology of stages of learning
We have offered an extended chronology of the stages of learning
that an organism will pass through in terms of the GEL model. This
chronology is intended as more of a suggestive exercise than an
exhaustive or detailed analysis. It is simply meant to place the
three detailed stages of learning presented in this paper into a
larger context of learned abilities in terms of the GEL model.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Characterization of the limitations of the GEL model
The above section characterized by example some of the
limitations of the GEL model; i.e., it can account for the learning
of sensorimotor schemata, but no more. It is interesting to note that
these are much the same limitations as those of many mammals, e.g.,
dogs and cats. We are pursuing the accurate characterization of the
limitations of the GEL model in part so that we may pose the following
question: In what way would one have to augment the learning and
memory operators of a GEL-like limited organism, in order to enable it
to go beyond these limitations to acquire some of the abilities unique
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to humans?
For each such 'extended' ability, we hope to specify precisely
the extra abilities that would have to be added to the CEL model, in -
the form of additional operators, extended functioning of operators,
extensions of episodic schemata or their indices, etc., in order to
enable the learning of these extra behavioral abilities. In other
words, we intend to specify the extra components that an "Extended"
CEL model, or ExCEL, would have to possess, in such a way as to
account for the extended behavioral abilities that that model would
exhibit. We view this as an important line of investigation to
pursue; i.e., comparative characterization of the limits of the CEL
model and the limits of the learning abilities of organisms may shed
some light on the additional capacities that are needed to allow
certain organisms to advance beyond the abilities of other organisms.
5.2 Psychobiological considerations
5.2.1 Components of learning and localization of function
One of the stated goals of the construction of the CEL model was
the hope that the components that emerged from our analysis of the
learning process might correspond to specific neurobiological
structures. It has long been the case that psychobiology has sought
to find specific brain structures (or combinations thereof) that
corresponded to specific observed behaviors or abilities. This has
been a goal at all levels of brain research, from the search for the
lowest-level synaptic changes underlying learning (e.g., Thompson
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et.al. 1980, Cohen 1969, Brons and Woody 1980, Weinberger 1980, etc.),
to the search for localization of certain observable functions, from
the occipital pathways of vision (e.g., Hubel and Weisel 1968, 1978,
Wurtz 1969, Mountcastle 1976, etc.), to the Broca-Wernicke pathways
associated with certain aspects of language comprehension and
production (see e.g., Penfield 1959, etc).
Indeed, Geschwind (1980) has cautioned AI researchers that
"there is no evidence for the existence of any all-purpose
computer [in the brain]. Instead, there seems to be a
multiplicity of systems for highly special tasks" (Geschwind
1980, p.191).
The research descriloed here has indeed led us a'way from viewing
learning and memory as arising from a "general purpose computer"; we
have ended up instead deriving a set of special-purpose mechanisms;
the twelve operators of the GEL model.
One major difference between the GEL model and previous models is
that most previous researchers in psychobiology have sought to isolate
and localize observable special-purpose functions, that is, those with
more or less observable behavioral correlates such as visual
perception, sentence production, etc. In contrast, our componential
analysis of the learning process cuts across such gross behavioral
categories as vision, language, etc., and attempts instead to identify
those mental operations that comprise the functional constituents
underlying a wide range of learning tasks. It may be the case that
our analysis could yield a set of special-purpose functions or
operators that are more closely identified with particular systems of
brain structures.
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The following section explores a specific example of this
possibility: the hippocampus may be associated with some subset of
the three Recording processes proposed in the CEL model. In
particular, it is shown that hypothetical lesions to any of the three-
Recording operators of the model will predict certain deficits in the
behavioral abilities of the model without damaging other abilities;
these predicted deficits of the model appear to correspond remarkably
well to the deficits associated with bilateral hippocampal lesions in
humans.
5.2.2 The Recording operators and the Hippocampus
There are a number of results in the literature of psychobiology
that have dealt with the behavioral correlates of damage to the
hippocampus, and, by inference, therefore relate to the possible
function of the undamaged hippocampus in a healthy brain. Some
widely-known results on memory and the hippocampus are reported by
Milner and Penfield (1955), Penfield and Milner (1958), Milner (1958),
and Milner (1959). The gist of the reported hippocampal effect on
memory is that a (human) patient with a damaged hippocampus has
trouble with new learning, while the patient's previously-learned
skills and knowledge seem to suffer no noticeable deficit. That is,
the patient can retrieve already-existing memories, but cannot
permanently record new memories. This remarkable deficit is best
illustrated by one of Milner's (1959) case histories of an epileptic
patient (known by his initials "H.M."), after having had most of his
hippocampus surgically removed:
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As far as we can tell this man has retained little if
anything of events subsequent to operation [radical bilateral
medial temporal-lobe resection], although his I.Q. rating is
actually slightly higher than before. Ten months before I
examined him his family had moved from their old house to one
a few blocks away on the same street. He still has not
learned the new address, though remembering the old one
perfectly, nor can he be trusted to find his way home alone.
He does not know where objects constantly in use are kept;
for example, his mother still has to tell him where to find
the lawn-mower, even though he may have been using it only the
day before. She also states that he will do the same jigsaw
puzzles day after day without showing any practice effect and
that he will read the same magazines over and over again
without finding their contents familiar (Milner 1959, p.49).
The details of such cases are absolutely striking; this man can
read, can converse, can do all the tasks he used to be able to do
before his operation, and his IQ test scores have not lowered. Yet he
cannot record new episodes in such a way as to be able to retrieve
them. (There are more complex aspects of this case; see for instance
Sidman, Stoddard and Mohr, 1968). In terms of the CEL model, these
findings imply that EITHER: (a) H.M. cannot NOTICE new episodes,
i.e., his brain fails to decide that these episodes are 'worth
recording', or (b) he cannot COLLECT new episodes into schemas, i.e.,
even if noticed, he fails to be able to package the events comprising
an episode into a schema, or (c) he cannot INDEX new episodic schemas
in such a way that they can be subsequently retrieved in the proper
context, i.e., even if the episode is collected into a schema, he
fails to attach any appropriate index pointing to the schema, and
hence when later on he is in a circumstance in which he should be
reminded of that schema, he is not reminded of it. Hence, although
the schema might actually have been created and exists somewhere in
his mind, it was not pointed to by any appropriate index, and hence
was 'lost' to his retrieval memory, having failed ever to be
45
appropriately anchored by a useful index.
In contrast, it could not be the case that the man's Retrieval
operators have been affected, since he is still readily able to
retrieve and reconstruct already-existing episodic schemata. Also, it
cannot be the case that specific records of episodes are what has been
lost, since there is no corresponding loss of previous abilities, nor
of previous memories; just the apparent inability to establish new
permanent memorial traces.
The CEL model, then, offers a specific prediction corresponding
to the deficits arising from hippocampal lesions in humans. In
particular, according to the theoretical framework of the CEL model, a
lesion to one or more of the three Recording operators should result
in a deficit in the ability to learn new memories, without impeding
any of the other operators of memory function. This theoretical
deficit corresponds remarkably well with the observed deficit
associated with hippocampal lesions in humans. Hence, we may
hypothesize that one or more of the three Recording operators (NOTICE,
COLLECT, INDEX) is performed by the hippocampus in humans; and,
therefore, damage or removal of the hippocampus will result in
inability to carry out this operator or operators, resulting in the
documented inability to record new schemata, while having no effect on
the retrieval of already-existing schemata, and hence causing no
deficit in the performance of tasks that rely on those existing
schemata.
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